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COLLABORATIVE LAW:  
THE FUTURE CORNERSTONE OF THE 
RESOLUTION PROCESS? 
 
LOUISE CROWLEY* 
 
 
I. WHAT IS COLLABORATIVE LAW? 
Collaborative law was developed originally in the United 
States,1 and more recently has received significant support from 
Irish family law practitioners. In essence its ultimate aim is not 
particularly novel – it seeks to encourage and facilitate the 
resolution of family law disputes without recourse to the 
adversarial courts system.2 Recent court-based research has 
confirmed the long-held view that it is the exception rather than 
the rule that a family law dispute will reach the courtroom.3  
What is different about the practice of collaborative law is that the 
resolution of the dispute becomes the primary, if not the sole aim, 
of both parties who sign up to an “agreement to agree” the details 
of the dissolution. Perhaps just as importantly, collaborative 
lawyers are parties to this non-adversarial approach to the dispute, 
and commit to relinquish their involvement in the case in the 
event that the parties eventually proceed to court hearing. In terms 
_____________________________________________________ 
* College Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University College Cork. 
1 The practice of collaborative law was first advocated in 1990 by Stuart Webb, 
a family lawyer from Minnesota.  
2 The collaborative law process is described by Tesler as consisting of “… two 
parties and their respective lawyers who sign a binding stipulation defining the 
scope and sole purpose of the lawyers’ representation: to help the parties 
engage in creative problem-solving aimed at reaching a negotiated agreement 
that meets the legitimate needs of both parties”: Tesler, Collaborative Law 
(American Bar Association, 2001), p. 7. 
3 See generally reports published by the Courts Service entitled Family Law 
Matters, setting out the research and analysis of Carol Coulter. For example, 
Coulter examined the settlement rates on the South-Western Circuit noting the 
variability of those rates but including a 96% settlement rate in Limerick 
Circuit Court cases. See (2007) 1(3) Family Law Matters 46, 46-47. In “Inside 
the Family Courts”, Irish Times, 7 March 2009, Coulter noted that more than 
90% of family law cases in the Circuit Court are settled without going to a full 
hearing. 
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of approach and effect, the practice of collaborative law sits 
somewhere in the middle of the family law dispute-resolution 
continuum, with mediation at one extreme end and court-based 
judicial adjudication at the other. Undoubtedly, the practice of 
collaborative law incorporates aspects of both approaches;  
in essence it can be regarded as the organised and focussed 
practice of dissolution-negotiation in the shadow of the law.  
This commentary seeks to identify the role of collaborative law 
within the context of family law dispute resolution, and in this 
regard will consider the related issues of state intervention in the 
family sphere, and the role and importance of the governing laws 
which serve as a backdrop to the collaborative law process. 
 
 
II. PRIVATE ORDERING VERSUS STATE INTERVENTION 
Family law is often viewed as a unique mix of public and 
private law: the autonomy of the individual members and the 
family unit as a whole existing within the confines of state 
supervision and regulation. Many developed states have 
traditionally rejected the categorisation of marriage as a contract 
that could be avoided or determined by agreement, on the basis 
that only the state can dictate the rights, duties, obligations, and 
requirements of marriage.  
 
When the contracting parties have entered into the married 
state, they have not so much entered into a contract as into 
a new relation, the rights, duties and obligations of which 
rest, not upon their agreement, but upon the general law of 
the State … They are of law, not [of] contract.4 
 
Irish lawmakers, both legislative and judicial, have long 
asserted the importance of the state’s capacity to retain ultimate 
control over the resolution of family disputes. The genesis of this 
need for control is perhaps easily identified, given the state’s 
particular and stated responsibilities towards the family as 
expressed in Article 41 of the Constitution. This constitutional 
_____________________________________________________ 
4 Per Appleton C.J. in Adams v. Palmer, quoted by the US Supreme Court in 
Maynard v. Hill (1888) 125 U.S. 190, at 211. This case confirmed that 
marriage is more than a contract. 
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protection applies not only to the family as a unit but also to the 
individual members of the family.5 Although this conflicts with 
the notion and practice of private contract law and the capacity of 
individuals to freely and voluntarily enter into a binding contract, 
such state involvement is permitted and even encouraged in 
family law, given the underlying and inescapable issues of public 
policy that arise.6 The relevant public policy issues concerning 
the courts in the context of marital disputes range from the 
enforcement of spousal and parental obligations to the state’s 
capacity to enforce maintenance obligations to avoid a spouse 
transferring her dependency from the husband to the state, 
thereby becoming a charge on the state. In particular, the Irish 
courts have regarded themselves as responsible for the protection 
of vulnerable family members, recognising the imbalance of 
power that might often exist within a family unit.7  
_____________________________________________________ 
5 In Murray v. Ireland [1985] I.R. 532 the High Court, per Costello J., drew a 
distinction between the collective rights of the family as an institution and the 
co-existing rights of individual members of the family, such rights being 
recognised and exercisable by virtue of the individual’s membership of the 
family unit. A similar position was taken by Denham J. in Sinnott v. Minister 
for Education [2001] 2 I.R. 545, 662, and by Keane C.J. in his dissenting 
judgment in North Western Health Board v. HW [2001] 3 I.R. 622, at 687. 
However, the veracity of this position is far from certain. In Murray at 537-
538, Costello J qualified the position by stating that individuals within the 
family unit do not enjoy rights under Article 41 which are separate to those 
guaranteed to the family unit. Similarly in L v. L [1992] 2 I.R. 77, 108,  
Finlay C.J. stated that Article 41does not grant rights to any individual member 
of the family against other members of the family, but rather serves to protect 
the family from external forces. 
6 For example in the context of a marital breakdown dispute in The State 
(Bouzagou) v. Station Sergeant, Fitzgibbon Street Garda Station [1985] I.R. 
426, Barrington J. noted that in the absence of an agreement between the 
husband and wife, the task of reconciling the rights of the individual members 
of the family was a matter for the courts to determine.  
7 State intervention in the regulation of the family and the protection of the 
rights of the vulnerable is most evident where there is evidence of parental 
failure in respect of the needs of the children. The matter received the studied 
attention of the Supreme Court in North Western Health Board v. HW [2001] 3 
I.R. 622, where the limits on the state’s right to intervene in the right of 
parental autonomy were recognised. In the context of marital disputes,  
the courts can, and have exercised their discretionary powers to provide 
substantially for the homemaker spouse who was financially dependent during 
the course of the marriage.  
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Notwithstanding this overriding supervisory role of the 
state, there is now an indisputable right for spouses to exercise 
substantial control over the terms of the dissolution of their 
marriage. The capacity of married parties to negotiate and be 
bound by a separation agreement reflects the more traditional 
non-interventionist approach of developed states in the private 
sphere of the family, preferring to allow parties to self-regulate 
their roles and responsibilities. The Irish judiciary have shown a 
growing willingness to acknowledge the capacity of parties to 
resolve financial and custodial disputes amongst themselves, and 
have embraced the practice of allowing disputing spouses,  
with the aid of counsel and/or mediators, to reach an agreement. 
Separation agreements and inter parte consents drawn up in lieu 
of a full court hearing typically receive significant support from 
the Irish courts, and are made orders of the court in the form they 
are presented.8 Spousal agreements arising from the practice of 
collaborative law fit neatly alongside the more traditional 
separation agreement, which is likely to be grounded in already-
issued judicial separation proceedings. However, this permissive 
approach to private ordering is only true to a point, and the Irish 
state has historically retained a residual supervisory role in 
respect of the resolution of issues between married parties.  
Whilst there now undoubtedly exists an inter-spousal freedom to 
privately agree the order of both marriage and marital breakdown, 
such freedom is always subject to the statutory and common law 
rights and obligations of both spouses.9  
_____________________________________________________ 
8 As supported by the research work of Carol Coulter, Family Law Matters, 
published by the Courts Service. Coulter traced the operations of the Dublin 
Circuit Family Court for the month of October 2006, noting that of the 161 
cases concluded in that month, only 16 went to a full hearing of the court:  
see (2007) 1(1) Family Law Matters 22, 22-23. Even more significantly, in a 
similar study of the practices of the Cork Circuit Family Court, an analysis of 
the 48 divorce and judicial separation applications listed for resolution in the 
two week family law session in October 2005, all 48 cases were settled, and 
none necessitated a court hearing: see (2007) 1(2) Family Law Matters 34, 34-
35. 
9 An interesting and oft-cited example of the statutory limits upon the capacity 
to contract is the decision of HD v. PD (Supreme Court, unreported, 8 May 
1978), where the husband sought to avoid his statutory obligation to provide 
for his spouse after the breakdown of the marriage. Walsh J. emphatically 
confirmed that it was not within the respondent’s legal capacity “to contract 
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Both the amendment to Article 41.3.2 º of the Constitution 
of Ireland, and the Family Law (Divorce) Act, 1996, require the 
court to be satisfied that proper provision has been made for both 
spouses and any children prior to granting a decree of divorce. 
Thus, irrespective of the fact of a negotiated agreement between 
the parties, the court must satisfy itself as to the achievement of 
this legal prerequisite. Similarly the Family Law (Divorce) Act, 
1996, s. 20(3), requires the court in considering the issue of 
ancillary relief “to have regard to the terms of any separation 
agreement which has been entered into by the spouses and is still 
in force”, meaning that the fact and content of the separation 
agreement must be considered by the court, but will not 
necessarily be given effect to. Whilst the courts have shown a 
growing willingness not to revisit the content of more recently 
drafted separation agreements,10 they retain the right to do so 
where justice and the constitutional requirement of proper 
provision so require. Finally, as regard the courts’ view of private 
ordering, the issue of the enforceability of pre-nuptial agreements 
under Irish law has recently been considered,11 and it has been 
suggested that they do not offend against the protection afforded 
to the institution of marriage, and are enforceable and capable of 
variation under existing Irish law. So it can be surmised that, 
whilst Irish lawmakers have shown a favourable disposition 
towards measures that facilitate inter parte negotiation and 
settlement, they will not be bound to enforce such agreements 
without examining and approving their content and effect.  
                                                                                                           
out of the Act by an Agreement made after the Act came into force or by an 
agreement entered into before the legislation was enacted”. The court held that 
under the Family Law (Maintenance of Spouses and Children) Act, 1976, s. 5,  
a maintenance order can be made by the courts if a spouse has failed to provide 
“such maintenance as is proper in the circumstances”. 
10 See the very trenchant views expressed in WA v. MA [2005] 1 I.R. 1,  
where Hardiman J regarded it as appropriate to give “very significant weight” 
to the terms of the separation agreement between the parties, and ultimately 
refused to order any further financial relief in favour of the applicant wife. 
11 The then Minster for Justice Equality and Law Reform, Michael McDowell, 
appointed a Study Group to study and report on the operation of the law since 
the introduction of divorce in 1996, taking into account constitutional 
requirements. The Study Group published its report in April 2007.  
See http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/PrenupRpt.pdf/Files/PrenupRpt.pdf. 
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III. IS IRISH FAMILY LAW SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR  
TO FACILITATE A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH? 
In light of the distinct nature of the marital relationship,  
the varying sacrifices and contributions of the parties to the union, 
and the often unavoidable notion and practice of dependence, 
financial or otherwise, most Western jurisdictions have enacted 
legislation permitting and even encouraging some level of state 
intervention regarding asset distribution on marital breakdown. 
Parties do not seek a settlement in a rights vacuum.  
Where divorcing spouses show a willingness to negotiate the 
terms of their settlement, it is entirely useful if their respective 
legal rights and obligations are identifiable.  
The success of any arbitration-based approach to dispute 
resolution will be influenced by the governing regulatory 
provisions within which it operates, even where there is no 
intention or preference by either party for reliance upon the more 
adversarial resolution options. Negotiations that are concluded 
between spouses are likely to be conducted with one eye on the 
likely outcome should that matter be adjudicated in the court.  
The negotiated resolution of the dispute might more easily be 
agreed against that established legal background; it might be 
easier for both sides to come to an agreement when it can be 
paralleled with the likely outcome had the matter come before a 
court.  
This point serves to highlight a weakness at present in Irish 
family law, in that it is regulated and determined by extensive 
judicial discretion. Such discretion is often exercised in the 
context of a policy vacuum, no more so than in divorce cases.  
In drafting the legislation the lawmakers have failed to enunciate 
clearly the end goal or objective of state regulation and ordering 
of marital dissolution. In particular, it remains unclear what 
purpose Irish law seeks to achieve in dividing marital assets.  
In the absence of such defined or identifiable policy objectives,  
it is difficult for courts to be consistent in their judgments, 
thereby depriving the system of the element of predictability that 
is a crucial backdrop to negotiated settlements.  
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IV. LEGISLATIVE APPROACH TO COLLABORATIVE LAW 
The merits of an approach to dispute resolution which 
establishes the main players as active participants in the process is 
one which has been encouraged by the Irish legislature in recent 
family law statutes. Although not expressly advocating or 
invoking the use of pure collaborative law practices, there has 
been a very deliberate legislative shift away from reliance upon 
court hearings, and a greater emphasis upon creating the 
environment and structures to encourage agreement-based 
resolution. Both the Family Law Act, 1995, and the Family Law 
(Divorce) Act, 1996, require the applicant’s solicitor to discuss 
the possibility of counselling and/or mediation with the client, 
prior to issuing the judicial separation proceedings.12 In this 
regard, the solicitor is required to furnish the applicant with a list 
of practitioners who might facilitate such counselling or 
mediation. Where reconciliation or mediated agreement do not 
represent viable options for the parties, the legislature has further 
mandated the advising solicitor to inform the client as to the 
possibility of negotiating the terms of the agreement by way of 
separation agreement. Thus, prior to issuing proceedings and 
involving the court in the process, the proposed applicant must be 
fully informed of all non-adversarial options available to facilitate 
the more amicable resolution of the difficulties.13 An almost 
identical approach in the context of proposed divorce proceedings 
was adopted by the legislature in the Family Law (Divorce) Act, 
1996.14 More recently, the Circuit Court Rules Committee has, 
with the concurrence of the Minister for Justice Equality and Law 
Reform, by way of statutory instrument,15 amended the court 
rules to establish a practice of case management meetings which 
seek to narrow the issues in dispute, thereby facilitating the 
negotiation of a settlement and/or isolating any contentious 
_____________________________________________________ 
12 Family Law Act, 1995, s. 5. 
13 The same obligation rests with the solicitor representing the respondent,  
and such advices and information must be furnished to the respondent prior to 
the filing of a defence to the proceedings – Family Law Act, 1995, s. 6. 
14 Family Law (Divorce) Act, 1996, ss. 6-7. 
15 Circuit Court Rules (Case Progression in Family Law Proceedings)  
(S.I. No. 358 of 2008). 
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issues. The case management meeting requires the attendance of 
the parties and/or their representatives and in practice can allow 
and facilitate inter parte talks with a view to resolution.  
In the neighbouring jurisdiction of England and Wales,  
the Family Law Association of lawyers, now interestingly 
renamed “Resolution”, has placed a significant emphasis on the 
role of mediation and negotiated settlements,16 and its ADR 
committee has noted the development by specialist solicitors of 
“round table conference” options to achieve a negotiated 
resolution, including “mediation, early neutral evaluation and 
collaborative law” practices.17 There is also evidence of strong 
judicial support for the collaborative law process, with 
applications for consent orders being fast-tracked through the 
court process where they are based on a collaborative negotiated 
agreement. In S v. P (Settlement by Collaborative Law Process)18 
Coleridge J., the President of the Family Division, in respect of a 
non-marital settlement arising from a collaborative law 
agreement, permitted the application for approval to be dealt with 
in the “urgent without notice applications list”, in order to allow 
the parties to avoid the lengthier standard consent order process. 
He did so with a view to establishing a structure which might 
incentivise couples to “knuckle down and negotiate an agreed 
conclusion”.19 In this regard he was of the view that “every 
conceivable encouragement should be given to parties to 
negotiate by this method”.20 
Very recently, the EU has echoed this preference for a 
conciliation-based approach to the resolution of marital disputes 
with the enactment of Directive 2008/52/EC: “the Mediation 
_____________________________________________________ 
16 It has been documented that since the arrival of the practice of collaborative 
law to England in 2003, Resolution has trained 1200 of its 5000 members as 
collaborative lawyers. See further the commentary of Daldorph and Todd, 
“ADR Professional: Encouragement for Collaborative Law” (2009) 39 Family 
Law 71. 
17 Thorpe L.J., “Statutory Arbitration in Ancillary Relief” (2008) 38 Family 
Law 26, 27. 
18 [2008] 2 F.L.R. 2040. 
19 [2008] 2 F.L.R. 2040, 2042. 
20 [2008] 2 F.L.R. 2040, 2042. 
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Directive”.21 Although the aim of the Directive is to encourage 
reliance upon mediation generally, it represents a clear EU 
legislative confirmation of the value and importance of inter parte 
collaboration in family law disputes. The emphasis in the 
Directive is on cross-border mediation, and states its aim as 
being:  
 
to facilitate access to alternative dispute resolution and to 
promote the amicable settlement of disputes by 
encouraging the use of mediation and by ensuring a 
balanced relationship between mediation and judicial 
proceedings.22  
 
The recitals to the Directive seek to highlight the 
advantages of negotiation-based approaches to dispute resolution; 
for example, Recital Six notes that mediation is a “cost-effective 
and quick extra-judicial” means of dealing with the resolution of 
disputes, “through processes tailored to the needs of the parties”. 
Further, it states that agreements that arise from mediation are 
more likely to be complied with, and “are more likely to preserve 
an amicable and sustainable relationship between the parties”. 
Whether collaborative law can be regarded as a form of mediation 
is a matter of debate. While those who prefer to mediate without 
the presence of representation regard the practice of collaborative 
law with an “anti-lawyer feeling”,23 Hodson is of the view that 
collaborative law should be explicitly incorporated within the 
definition of Alternative Dispute Resolution.24 Further, mediation 
as defined by the Directive shares many of the traits of the 
practice of collaborative law; the Directive’s definition of 
mediation refers to the “structured process … whereby two or 
more parties to a dispute attempt … on a voluntary basis, to reach 
_____________________________________________________ 
21 Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 
May 2008 on Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters 
[2008] O.J. L136/3.  
22 Article 1. 
23 Hodson, “The EU Mediation Directive: The European Encouragement to 
Family Law ADR”, [2008] International Family Law 209. 
24 Hodson (previous note). 
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an agreement on the settlement of their dispute”.25 However, 
what separates collaborative law from the mediation envisaged by 
the Directive is the requirement that the structure involve one 
facilitator of negotiations, with the parties not typically 
represented at those negotiation meetings. It is arguable that in 
creating too narrow a concept of mediation, the EU has lost an 
opportunity for the promotion of a general conciliatory approach 
to dispute resolution, capable of taking a variety of forms. 
Nonetheless, the Directive has been welcomed as a  
“much needed, very timely” impetus from the EU that should be 
“seized … as an opportunity to improve greatly the practice and 
use of family mediation”.26  
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The peculiarities of family law disputes, particularly those 
involving once married parties, can often give rise to post-
resolution circumstances which demand that the disputing parties 
maintain contact. Irrespective of whether financial independence 
is secured for one or both parties at the time of the dissolution of 
the marriage, circumstances can demand a lack of actual clean 
break in the relationship. This is most likely to occur where there 
are children of the union, with the custody and access 
arrangements necessitating this long-lasting inter parte contact. 
Given the survival of ties between the now divorced spouses,  
any resolution approach that encourages and facilitates a non-
confrontational attitude to settlement is worthy of promotion.  
The collaborative law approach to the resolution of the 
dissolution of the marriage and the agreement of arrangements 
into the future is arguably a better starting point than courtroom 
adjudication, and is more likely to encourage civilised relations. 
Irish courts have displayed a willingness to be led by the content 
_____________________________________________________ 
25 Article 3 defines mediation as “a structured process, however named or 
referred to, whereby two or more parties to a dispute attempt by themselves, on 
a voluntary basis, to reach an agreement on the settlement of their dispute with 
the assistance of a mediator. This process may be initiated by the parties or 
suggested or ordered by a court or prescribed by the law of a member state”. 
26 Hodson, “The EU Mediation Directive: The European Encouragement to 
Family Law ADR”, [2008] International Family Law 209. 
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of negotiated settlements, particularly where those agreements 
substantially achieve the nebulous aims of fairness and justice 
between the parties. The favourable treatment of separation 
agreements, divorce consent agreements and potentially even pre-
nuptial agreements, signal a recognition of the important role of 
negotiated settlements in the context of marital dispute resolution. 
The process of collaborative law represents a further means by 
which the otherwise contentious area of marital breakdown might 
be more amicably resolved. The necessary structures and training 
programmes for the use and promotion of collaborative law 
practices have been established by a significant number of Irish 
family law practitioners. It remains to be seen whether the Irish 
public and courts system adopt a favourable view of this means of 
negotiation. 
 
 
